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Abstract 
To analyze the effects of patent policy on growth and inequality, this paper develops a quality-
ladder model with wealth heterogeneity and elastic labor supply. The model predicts that strengthening 
patent protection increases (a) growth by stimulating R&D and (b) income inequality by raising the return 
on assets. Elastic labor supply creates an additional effect on income inequality. As for consumption 
inequality, the effect is ambiguous and depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Calibrating 
the model to US data shows that strengthening patent protection increases income inequality by more than 
consumption inequality, and this pattern is consistent with the data.  
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1. Introduction 
Since the seminal work of Simon Kuznets (1955), the tradeoff between growth and inequality has been an 
important issue in economics. Given that economic growth is driven by technological progress which in 
turn is influenced by innovation policies, this paper analyzes the effects of patent policy on economic 
growth and income inequality within an R&D-based endogenous-growth model. In the model, the effect 
of patent policy on income inequality is driven by the rate of return on assets. Therefore, even if patents 
do not represent a significant fraction of assets in reality,1 the effect of patent policy on income inequality 
can still be significant in the presence of other capital incomes that depend on the real interest rate. 
Although the prevailing wisdom is that the rising income inequality in the US is largely driven by an 
increase in the relative wage between skilled and unskilled workers, some studies, such as Atkinson (2000, 
2003), suggest that inequality in capital income is also playing an increasingly important role. For 
example, Reed and Cancian (2001) show that capital income contributes to one quarter of the increase in 
income inequality in the 90’s while it accounts for less than one-tenth of the increase in the 70’s. The 
current study relates to this literature by providing a model that highlights the effects of capital income on 
the rising inequality in the US. 
The growth-theoretical framework is a canonical quality-ladder model with the additions of 
heterogeneity in households’ wealth, variable patent breadth and elastic labor supply. The model predicts 
that strengthening patent protection increases (a) economic growth by stimulating R&D investment and 
(b) income inequality by raising the return on assets. However, whether it also increases consumption 
inequality depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. If this elasticity is less (greater) than 
unity, strengthening patent protection would increase (decrease) consumption inequality. Calibrating the 
model to aggregate data of the US economy shows that strengthening patent protection leads to a larger 
increase in income inequality than consumption inequality. This divergence between income and 
consumption inequality is consistent with the empirical pattern in the US. 
                                                 
1 According to Nakamura (2003), the market value of intangible assets in the US is at least $5 trillion in 2000 (i.e. 
about 50% of US GDP). Although intangible assets include patents and copyrights that are innovation-related, they 
also include trademarks and goodwill that may be unrelated to innovation. 
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 Krueger and Perri (2006) and Blundell et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence to show that the 
sharp increase in income inequality in the US since the 80’s was accompanied by a much smaller increase 
in consumption inequality. For example, based on the Consumer Expenditure Survey, Krueger and Perri 
(2006) find that the variance of log of income (consumption) increases by over 20% (about 5%) from 
1980 to 2004. During the same period, R&D investment as a share of GDP has increased (see Figures 1) 
while patent protection in the U.S. has strengthened.2 Table 1 presents an index for the strength of patent 
protection in the US from Park (2008).3  
Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
United States 3.83 3.83 3.83 3.83 4.35 4.68 4.68 4.88 4.88 4.88 
Table 1: Index of Patent Rights from Park (2008)
 
Given this empirical pattern, I calibrate the R&D-growth model to see whether it can replicate a similar 
divergence in income and consumption inequality as in the data. The model predicts that the coefficient of 
variation of income over the coefficient of variation of consumption increases from 1.55 in 1980 to 1.69 
in 2004. This finding suggests that patent policy may provide a partial explanation for the recent trend of 
income and consumption inequality in the US. 
The intuition of the results is as follows. Strengthening patent protection increases R&D as well 
as the equilibrium growth rate that drives up the rate of return on assets. This higher return on assets 
increases the income of asset-wealthy households relative to asset-poor households. Furthermore, the 
allowance of elastic labor supply creates an additional effect on income inequality through labor income, 
and this effect will be discussed in details in the main text. As for the ambiguous effect on consumption 
inequality, the higher growth rate also increases the fraction of assets for saving. Therefore, whether the 
relative consumption between asset-wealthy households and asset-poor households increases or decreases 
                                                 
2 See Jaffe (2000), Gallini (2002) and Jaffe and Lerner (2004) for a discussion on the changes in patent policy. 
According to the Patent and Trademark Office, the number of patent applications and patents granted in the US was 
quite stable between 1963 and 1979. Then, the number of patent applications increases from 112,379 in 1980 to 
484,955 in 2007 while the number of patents granted increases from 66,170 in 1980 to 182,901 in 2007.  
3 The index is on a scale of 0 to 5, and a larger number indicates stronger patent protection. See Ginarte and Park 
(1997) and Park (2008) for details. 
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depends on the relative increase in the equilibrium growth rate and the real interest rate, which in turn is 
determined by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. 
 
Literature Review 
Since the seminal Kuznets curve that hypothesizes an inverted U-shape effect of economic development 
on income inequality, economists have become interested in the empirical relationship between economic 
growth and income inequality. Early empirical studies, such as Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and 
Tabellini (1994) and Perotti (1996), find a negative relationship while the more recent studies, such as Li 
and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000), find a positive relationship. Forbes (2000) argues that the different 
results are due to omitted-variable bias and measurement error in previous studies and suggests the use of 
panel estimation and improved data on inequality to overcome these problems. Barro (2000) considers a 
larger sample of countries than Forbes (2000) and finds a positive (negative) relationship between growth 
and inequality in developed (developing) countries. Assuming that economic growth in developed 
countries is driven by innovation, the theoretical result that stronger patent protection increases income 
inequality is consistent with a positive relationship between growth and inequality in developed countries.  
  Early theoretical studies, such as Galor and Zeira (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson 
and Tabellini (1994), tend to derive a negative relationship between growth and inequality. Garcia-
Penalosa and Turnovsky (2006) argue that the theoretical relationship between growth and inequality 
should be ambiguous and depends on the underlying structural and policy changes. To explore this 
theoretical relationship, they incorporate heterogeneity in households’ wealth into a canonical AK growth 
model with capital externality and elastic labor supply. The comparative static results show that a positive 
growth-inequality relationship is more likely to emerge. They also derive a law of motion for the 
distribution of assets and show that the distribution is stationary in the model.4 The current study adopts a 
similar approach to show that the distribution of assets is also stationary in a canonical quality-ladder 
                                                 
4 See, also, Bertola (1993) for an early study on income distribution in the AK model and Caselli and Ventura (2000) 
for an interesting study that considers multiple dimensions of heterogeneity.  
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growth model. An interesting difference between the two models is that the AK model relies on elastic 
labor supply to generate an endogenous income distribution while the quality-ladder model does not. 
Nonetheless, the consideration of elastic labor supply is still interesting because it creates an additional 
channel through which growth affects income inequality through labor income. 
 Although the capital-accumulation-driven growth models are useful frameworks for analyzing 
many macroeconomic issues, they are not suitable for evaluating innovation policies. Therefore, the 
current study incorporates wealth heterogeneity and elastic labor supply into an R&D-driven endogenous-
growth model to analyze the effects of patent policy on growth and inequality. Chou and Talmain (1996), 
Li (1998), Zweimuller (2000) and Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006) also consider wealth heterogeneity in 
R&D-growth models. However, they focus on the effects of wealth inequality on growth. The current 
paper differs from these studies by considering the effects of patent policy on income and consumption 
inequality given wealth inequality that is independent of growth in the model.  
 Bertola et al. (chapter 10, 2006) also considers an R&D-growth model in which wealth inequality 
is independent of growth due to homothetic preferences. Bertola et al. analyze the effect of firms’ market 
power determined by the elasticity of substitution between products on the distribution of income between 
workers and entrepreneurs, and they derive an inverse relationship between the labor share of income and 
the market power of firms. The current study explores a different issue. It firstly derives a closed-form 
expression for the coefficient of variation of income/consumption and then shows that stronger patent 
protection has a positive effect on income inequality but an ambiguous effect on consumption inequality. 
The current study also differs from Bertola et al. in the following ways. Firstly, they consider a variety-
expanding model with inelastic labor supply while the current study considers a quality-ladder model with 
elastic labor supply that creates an additional effect on income inequality. Secondly, the current study 
analyzes consumption inequality in addition to income inequality and shows that these two measures of 
inequality could in theory go in opposite directions. Finally, the current study also provides a quantitative 
analysis to illustrate the effects of patent breadth on income and consumption inequality. 
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This paper also relates to the issue on the underinvestment in R&D. There is an important 
empirical literature that finds the social return to R&D to be much higher than the private return.5 Jones 
and Williams (1998, 2000) develop an R&D-growth model and use these empirical estimates to quantify 
that the socially optimal level of R&D is at least two to four times higher than the market level. Given this 
underinvestment in R&D, patent policy is a relevant instrument that can be used to correct for this market 
failure and increase growth. In the R&D-growth literature, Li (2001) and O’Donoghue and Zweimuller 
(2004) analyze the growth effects of patent breadth in a quality-ladder model that has a representative 
household. Given that patent policy may affect inequality, the current paper contributes to this literature 
by providing a theoretical framework that highlights the distributional consequences of patent policy. As 
for empirical studies, Goel and Ram (1994) and Goel et al. (2008) examine the effect of R&D on growth. 
Using cross-country data, Goel and Ram (1994) find a positive effect that is also significant for a subset 
of empirical specifications. Using time-series data in the US, Goel et al. (2008) also find a positive 
relationship between non-federal R&D and growth although the effect is even stronger for federal R&D 
and especially defense R&D. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 defines the 
equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the effects of patent breadth and calibrates the model. The final section 
concludes with policy implications. 
 
2. A Quality-Ladder Model with Heterogeneous Households 
This section develops a quality-ladder model similar to Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and 
Helpman (1991) by adding mainly three features (a) heterogeneity in households’ wealth, (b) variable 
patent breadth as in Li (2001), and (c) elastic labor supply. Given that quality-ladder models have been 
well-studied, the model’s familiar components will be briefly described below while the new features will 
be described in more details. 
 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Griliches (1992) for a review of this literature.  
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 2.1. Households  
There is a unit continuum of identical households (except for the initial distribution of wealth) indexed by 
]1,0[∈h . Each household h has a standard iso-elastic utility function given by  
(1) ∫∞ −− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−=
0
1
1
1)]()([)( . dthlhCehU ttt γ
γφ
ρ . 
),0( ∞∈γ  is the inverse of the intertemporal substitution elasticity γε /1≡ . 1== εγ  corresponds to 
the case of log utility. )(hCt  is the consumption of final goods. Each household is endowed with one unit 
of time to allocate between leisure )(hlt  and work )(hLt . 0≥φ  is a preference parameter on leisure, and 
setting φ  to zero corresponds to the case of inelastic labor supply. ρ  is the exogenous discount rate. To 
ensure that lifetime utility is bounded, the following parameter restriction is imposed on the discount rate.  
Condition D (Discount Rate): g)1( γρ −> , 
where g  denotes the balanced-growth rate of consumption.  
Each household maximizes utility subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by  
(2) )()()()( hCPhLWhVRhV ttttttt −+=& . 
)(hVt  is the nominal value of assets owned by household h at time t. The share of assets owned by 
household h at time 0 is exogenously given by 000, /)()( VhVhsv ≡  that has a general distribution function 
with a mean of one and a standard deviation of vσ . tR  is the nominal rate of return on assets. Household 
h endogenously supplies )(hLt  to earn the nominal wage rate tW . tP  is the price of final goods. From 
the household’s intratemporal optimization, household h’s labor supply is determined by 
(3) )()()(1 . hCPhlhL tttt φ==− , 
where tW  is normalized to one. From the household’s intertemporal optimization, the familiar Euler 
equation is given by  
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Lemma 1 shows that the consumption growth rate is the same across households. To ensure that the Euler 
equation has the usual properties, the following parameter restriction is imposed. 
Condition E (Euler Equation): 0)1( >−− γφγ . 
 
Lemma 1: Aggregate consumption and the consumption of household h evolve according to  
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for all h. Also, aggregate labor supply is determined by ttt CPL .1 φ−= .   
Proof: Differentiate (3) with time and substitute it into (4). As for tL , integrate (3) with h.■  
 
Final goods are produced by a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator over a continuum of 
differentiated intermediates goods ]1,0[∈i  given by  
(6) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫1
0
)(lnexp diiXC tt . 
I define a stationary variable ttt CPE ≡  that denotes the aggregate nominal expenditure, which will be 
used to analyze the stability of the balanced-growth path.  
 
 2.2. Intermediate Goods 
There is a continuum of industries indexed by ]1,0[∈i  producing the differentiated intermediate goods. 
In each industry i, there is a monopolistic leader, who holds a patent on the latest invention and dominates 
the market until the next invention occurs. The production function for the leader in industry i is  
(7) )()( ,
)( iLziX tx
in
t
t= . 
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)(, iL tx  is the number of workers in industry i. 1>z  is the exogenous productivity improvement from 
each invention, and )(int  is the number of inventions that have occurred as of time t. Given 
)(intz , 
(8) )()( /1/)( inintt tt zzWiMC ==  
is the nominal marginal cost of production for the leader in industry i.  
As commonly assumed in the literature, the current and former industry leaders engage in 
Bertrand competition, and the profit-maximizing price for the current leader is a constant markup over the 
marginal cost given by  
(9) )(),()( iMCbziP tt μ= , 
where bzbz =),(μ  for ]1,0(∈b  that captures the level of patent breadth.6 In Aghion and Howitt (1992) 
and Grossman and Helpman (1991), there is complete patent protection against imitation such that 1=b . 
Li (2001) generalizes the policy environment to capture incomplete patent protection against imitation 
such that )1,0(∈b .7 Because of incomplete patent protection, the current leader’s invention enables the 
former leader to increase her productivity by a factor of bz −1  without infringing the current leader’s 
patent. Therefore, the limit-pricing markup for the current leader is given by bz . An increase in the level 
of patent breadth b  enables the current leader to charge a higher markup μ , and the resulting increase in 
the amount of monopolistic profit improves the incentives for R&D and stimulates growth.  
  
                                                 
6 The degree of patent breadth b can also be interpreted as the fraction of an invention 1−z  that is protected by its 
patent. To see this, 1ln)1( −≈≈− bzzbzb  that is the markup. In reality, when an inventor applies for a patent to 
protect her invention, she makes a number of claims about this invention to be reviewed by a patent examiner. If 
some of these claims are too specific, then imitators may be able to imitate around them to avoid patent infringement. 
7 O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) refer to this form of patent protection as lagging breadth, and they formalize 
another form of patent protection known as leading breadth (i.e. patent protection against subsequent innovations). 
For the purpose of the current study, the consideration of lagging patent breadth is sufficient.   
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 2.3. R&D and Aggregate Technology 
Denote the nominal value of an invention in industry i as )(~ iVt . Due to the Cobb-Douglas specification in 
(6), the amount of monopolistic profit is the same across industries (i.e. tt i ππ =)(  for ]1,0[∈i ). As a 
result, tt ViV
~)(~ =  for ]1,0[∈i . Because patents are the only assets in the economy, their market value 
equals the value of assets owned by households (i.e. tt VV =~ ). The familiar no-arbitrage condition is  
(10) tttttt VVVR λπ −+= & . 
The left-hand side of (10) is the nominal return on this asset. The right-hand side of (10) is the sum of (a) 
the monopolistic profit tπ  generated by this asset, (b) the potential capital gain, and (c) the expected 
capital loss due to creative destruction, in which tλ  is the Poisson arrival rate of inventions.  
 There is a continuum of R&D entrepreneurs indexed by ]1,0[∈j , and they hire workers to create 
inventions. The expected profit for entrepreneur j is 
(11) )()()( ,, jLWjVj trttttr −= λπ . 
The Poisson arrival rate of inventions for entrepreneur j is )()( ,. jLj trt ϕλ = , where ϕ  captures the 
productivity of R&D workers. The zero-profit condition from the R&D sector is given by  
(12) 1== tt WVϕ . 
This condition determines the allocation of labor between production and R&D.  
The Cobb-Douglas specification in (6) implies that each industry i employs an equal number of 
workers. Substituting (7) into (6) yields txtt LZC ,= , where the level of aggregate technology is defined 
as ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡ ∫∫ ttt zdzdiinZ
0
1
0
lnexpln)(exp τλτ  in which the last equality uses the law of large numbers. 
Differentiating tZln  with respect to time yields the growth rate of aggregate technology given by 
zZZg tttt ln/ λ=≡ & , where trt L ,.ϕλ =  is the economy-wide arrival rate of inventions. In other words, 
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although the invention process of each R&D entrepreneur is stochastic, the idiosyncratic uncertainty 
washes out at the aggregate level. As a result, aggregate technology increases at a constant rate along the 
balanced-growth path. 
 
3. Decentralized Equilibrium 
This section defines the equilibrium and shows that the aggregate economy is always on a unique and 
stable balanced-growth path. Given the balanced-growth behavior of the economy and a distribution of 
initial wealth, Section 3.1 shows that the distribution of assets in subsequent periods is stationary.  
The equilibrium is a sequence of prices ∞=0}),(,,,{ tttttt ViPPWR  and a sequence of allocations 
∞
=0,, )}(),(),(),(),({ ttttrtxt hChLjLiLiX  such that in each period,  
a. household ]1,0[∈h  chooses )}(),({ hLhC tt  to maximize utility taking },,{ ttt PWR  as given;  
b. the monopolistic leader in industry ]1,0[∈i  chooses )}(),({ , iLiP txt  to maximize profit according 
to the Bertrand competition and taking }{ tW  as given; 
c. R&D entrepreneur ]1,0[∈j  chooses )}({ , jL tr  to maximize profit taking },{ tt VW  as given;  
d. the market for final goods clears such that ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛== ∫∫ 1
0
1
0
)(lnexp)( diiXCdhhC ttt ; 
e. the labor market clears such that ∫∫∫ +==
1
0
,
1
0
,
1
0
)()()( djjLdiiLLdhhL trtxtt .  
To prove that the aggregate economy is always on a unique and stable balanced-growth path, I 
derive the law of motion for tE  in the appendix and show that it must jump to its steady-state value. The 
following parameter restriction is a necessary condition for the saddle-point stability.8 
Condition S (Saddle-Point Stability):    )1,(
ln
1 −∞∈≡+−> γϕ
ϕργ
z
. 
                                                 
8 The sufficient condition will be derived in Appendix A. 
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Lemma 2: The aggregate economy is always on a unique and stable balanced-growth path, and the 
balanced-growth equilibrium is characterized by  
(13) 
z
LL rtr ln)1()1/()1(
)/1()1/()1(
, −+++
+−++== γφμμφ
ϕρφμμφ
, 
(14) rt Lzgg )ln(ϕ== , 
(15) grrt .γρ +== , 
(16) )1/(])[( φ++−= ttt wvgrC . 
Proof: See Appendix A.■  
 
tttt PPRr /&−≡  denotes the real interest rate. ttt PWw /≡  and ttt PVv /≡  denote respectively the real 
wage rate and the real value of assets that are both increasing at rate g along the balanced-growth path. In 
(16), tt wC >+ )1( φ  because 0)1( >−+=− ggr γρ  from Condition D. The effect of increasing patent 
breadth on the equilibrium is as follows. A larger μ  increases the incentives for R&D; as a result, R&D 
labor increases. The increase in rL  increases the equilibrium growth rate g  and the real interest rate r . 
To ensure that 0>rL , I impose the following lower bound on the productivity of R&D labor.  
Condition R (R&D Productivity): )1/()1( −+> μφμρϕ . 
 
3.1. Distribution of Assets 
I adopt a similar approach as in Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2006) to show that the distribution of 
assets is stationary. To do this, it is more convenient to rewrite (2) in terms of real variables such that  
(17) )()()()( hChLwhvrhv tttttt −+=& . 
The real aggregate value of assets evolves according to  
(18) tttttt CLwvrv −+=& . 
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Combining (17) and (18) yields the law of motion for tttv vhvhs /)()(, ≡  given by  
(19) 
)(
)()(
)(
)(
)(
)(
,
,
hv
hLwhC
v
LwC
v
v
hv
hv
hs
hs
t
ttt
t
ttt
t
t
t
t
tv
tv −−−=−= &&& . 
Using )()](1[ . hChLw ttt φ=−  on (19), )(, hs tv  evolves according to a simple linear differential equation  
(20) 
t
ttc
tv
t
tt
tv v
wChshs
v
wChs −+−−+= )1()()()1()( ,, φφ& . 
(20) describes the potential evolution of )(, hs tv  given an initial value of )(0, hsv . ttc ChChs /)()( ≡  is a 
stationary variable from Lemma 1. Because tC , tw  and tv  all increase at rate g , the coefficient on 
)(, hs tv  and the last term in (20) are constant. Also, given that the coefficient on )(, hs tv  is positive (recall 
that tt wC >+ )1( φ ), the only solution consistent with long-run stability is 0)(, =hs tv&  for all t. 
Furthermore, from (20), 0)(, =hs tv&  for all t implies that  
(21) )1/(])()[()( φ++−= ttt whvgrhC . 
 
Lemma 3: For every household, )()( 0,, hshs vtv =  for all t.   
Proof: Proven in the text.■  
 
4. Effects of Patent Policy on Income and Consumption Inequality 
Given that the economy is always on a unique and stable balanced-growth path and the distribution of 
assets is stationary, this section analyzes the effects of increasing patent breadth on income and 
consumption inequality. The amount of real income earned by household h is  
(22) )1/(])()[()()()( . φφ +++=+= ttttttt whvgrhLwhvrhy , 
where the last equality uses )()( . hChlw ttt φ=  and (21). From (12) and Lemma 3, the share of income 
earned by household h simplifies to  
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(23) ϕφ
ϕφ
++
++=≡
gr
hsgr
y
hyhs v
t
t
ty
.
. )()()()( 0,,  
for all t. (23) implies that the standard deviation of income share ∫ −≡ 1
0
2
, ]1)([ dhhs tyyσ  is  
(24) vy gr
gr σϕφ
φσ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++
+=
.
.
. 
Using the standard deviation of income share (i.e. the coefficient of variation of income) as a measure of 
income inequality, Proposition 1 summarizes the effect of patent policy on income inequality.   
 
Proposition 1: An increase in the level of patent breadth increases income inequality.  
Proof: An increase in b  (i.e. an increase in μ ) raises r  and g , which in turn increases yσ .■ 
 
Intuitively, a larger patent breadth increases R&D and hence the equilibrium growth rate. This higher 
growth rate drives up the real interest rate, and the resulting higher return on assets increases the share of 
income )(hsy  earned by asset-wealthy households (i.e. 1)( >hsv ) while it decreases that of asset-poor 
households (i.e. 1)( <hsv ). In addition to this interest-rate effect, (24) shows that patent breadth also has 
a labor-income effect (captured by g.φ ) on income inequality in the case of elastic labor supply. (21) 
shows that holding r  constant, a higher growth rate reduces a household’s consumption by increasing its 
saving )(. hvg t . This lower level of consumption reduces the household’s leisure and hence increases its 
labor income. Furthermore, this effect is stronger for a household that has a larger amount of assets as 
shown in (22). Therefore, when the supply of labor is elastic, there is an additional labor-income channel 
through which patent breadth affects income inequality.  
 The consumption of final goods for household h is given by (21). Using (12), (16) and Lemma 3 
yields household h’s share of consumption given by  
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(25) ϕ
ϕ
+−
+−=≡
gr
hsgr
C
hChs v
t
t
tc
)()()()( 0,,  
for all t. (25) implies that the standard deviation of consumption share ∫ −≡ 1
0
2
, ]1)([ dhhs tccσ  is  
(26) vc gr
gr σϕσ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−
−= . 
Proposition 2 summarizes the effect of patent policy on consumption inequality measured by the 
coefficient of variation of consumption.   
 
Proposition 2: An increase in the level of patent breadth increases (decreases) consumption inequality if 
and only if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less (greater) than unity.  
Proof: An increase in b  (i.e. an increase in μ ) raises r  and g . (15) shows that the resulting increases in 
r  and g  lead to a higher (lower) cσ  if and only if γε /1=  is less (greater) than one.■ 
 
Intuitively, strengthening patent protection increases growth, and this higher growth rate increases each 
household’s saving )(. hvg t . At the same time, the higher growth rate also increases each household’s 
asset income )(. hvr t . Given that the fraction of assets for consumption is given by gr − , whether or not 
the increase in asset income is sufficient to compensate for the increase in saving depends on the value of 
ε . For ε  less (greater) than one, gr −  increases (decreases). A larger gr −  increases the share of 
consumption of asset-wealthy households (i.e. 1)( >hsv ) and decreases that of asset-poor households (i.e. 
1)( <hsv ). The opposite occurs when gr −  decreases. For the case of log utility, ρ=− gr  and hence 
consumption inequality is simply given by )/( ϕρρσσ += vc .  
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 Finally, Proposition 3 ranks the different measures of inequality according to their value, and the 
theoretical ranking is consistent with the empirical pattern in the US as documented by Budria-Rodriguez 
et al. (2002), Krueger and Perri (2006) and Blundell et al. (2008). 
 
Proposition 3: Wealth inequality > income inequality > consumption inequality. 
Proof: Comparing (24) and (26) shows that cyv σσσ >> .■ 
 
4.1. Numerical Analysis 
This section calibrates the model to aggregate data of the US economy in order to numerically evaluate 
the effects of patent breadth on income and consumption inequality. From the model, I express each of 
the following moments as a function of structural parameters and then use the values of these moments in 
the data to infer the parameter values. I use standard values for the fraction of time devoted to leisure 
7.0=l , the real rate of return on assets 07.0=r , and total factor productivity growth 01.0=g . For the 
arrival rate of inventions, I set λ  to 0.33 such that the average time between arrivals of inventions is 3 
years as in Acemoglu and Akcigit (2008). R&D spending as a share of GDP is given by )/( wLwLr +π  
in the model. Assuming that the increase in R&D spending since the 80’s has been driven by patent 
protection, the hypothetical exercise is to firstly use the time trend of R&D from 1980 to 2004 to infer a 
time path for patent breadth b  and then examine how the increase in b  affects the relative level of 
income and consumption inequality. Figure 1 plots R&D as a share of GDP and its trend. 
For a given value of γ , the five moment conditions determine respectively the values of 
},,,,{ bz ϕρφ . As for γ , I use a conservative value of 3 implying an intertemporal substitution elasticity 
of 0.33 that is within the usual range in the business-cycle literature.9 The calibrated parameter values are 
}62.0,4.71,03.1,04.0,33.2,3{ 1980 ====== bz ϕρφγ . The values of the standard parameters are 
                                                 
9 At a lower value of γ  (i.e. a larger ε ), strengthening patent protection would increase income inequality relative 
to consumption inequality by even more.  
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reasonable, and the large value of ϕ  implies that asset income from patents tvr .  is very small compared 
to labor income Lwt , where tt vw .ϕ=  from (12). This implication also seems reasonable given that labor 
income and industrial R&D are on average about 70% and less than 2% of GDP respectively.  
 The calibrated value of b  gradually increases from 0.62 in 1980 to 0.86 in 2004 implying a 
substantial increase in the level of patent breadth. As a result of the increase in b , the model predicts that 
the relative coefficient of variation between income and consumption (i.e. cy σσ / ) increases from 1.55 in 
1980 to 1.69 in 2004. This illustrative exercise suggests that for a given degree of wealth inequality, 
increasing patent breadth leads to a larger increase in income inequality than consumption inequality such 
that cy σσ /  increases over time, which is consistent with the empirical pattern in the US.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the effects of patent policy on growth and inequality. In summary, strengthening 
patent protection increases growth but worsens income inequality. However, the effect on consumption 
inequality is ambiguous and depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Given these results, 
the policy implications are as follows. Firstly, when policymakers use patent policy as a policy instrument 
to increase R&D and economic growth, they need to take into account the distributional consequences 
which may have negative impacts on the society. Secondly, the possible divergence between income and 
consumption inequality suggests that policymakers need to choose the relevant and appropriate measure 
of inequality when evaluating the policy outcome.  
The theoretical framework is a canonical quality-ladder model with heterogeneity in households’ 
wealth. In this model, the aggregate economy is always on a unique and stable balanced-growth path. 
Given the balanced-growth behavior of the aggregate economy and an exogenous distribution of initial 
wealth, the endogenous distribution of assets in subsequent periods is stationary and equal to its initial 
distribution. Therefore, one potential weakness of the model is that it takes the distribution of wealth as 
given. For example, if this model needs to capture the rise in wealth inequality in the US from 1983 to 
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1998 as documented by Wolff (1994, 1998), then it would have to be formulated as an exogenous shock 
to the model. Furthermore, the model does not feature capital accumulation for analytical tractability. 
Therefore, a useful direction for future research is to develop an R&D-growth model that endogenizes the 
wealth distribution and features capital accumulation in order to provide a more accurate assessment on 
the quantitative importance of patent policy on the distributions of wealth, income and consumption. 
Finally, the canonical quality-ladder model belongs to the first generation of R&D-growth models 
that exhibit scale effects,10 in which a larger economy experiences faster growth and an economy that has 
a growing population experiences an increasing growth rate rather than a balanced-growth path. In this 
study, scale effects are eliminated by normalizing the population size to unity. Another useful direction 
for future research is to analyze the distributional consequences of patent policy in the later vintages of 
R&D-growth models. 
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Appendix A 
Proof of Lemma 2: To show the stability and uniqueness of the balanced-growth path, I derive the law of 
motion for ttt CPE ≡  and analyze its dynamics. The labor-market clearing condition is  
(A1) trtxt LLL ,, += . 
From aggregate labor supply, tt EL .1 φ−= . From the labor share of aggregate expenditure, μ/, ttx EL = . 
From the R&D production function, ϕλ /, ttrL = . Substituting these conditions into (A1) yields 
(A2) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−= tt Eμ
μφϕλ 11 . 
From (5), the law of motion for tE  is  
(A3) 
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The price index is ttt ZdiiPP /)(lnexp
1
0
μ=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫ . Therefore, zZZPP ttttt ln// λ−=−= && . As for tR , 
using (10) and (12) yields  
(A4) ϕ
ϕλπλπ
/1
/tt
t
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t V
VVR −=−+= & . 
Using the profit share μμπ /)1( −= tt E  and substituting (A4) into (A3) yield 
(A5) 
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Substituting (A2) into (A5) yields  
(A6) ⎟⎟⎠
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. 
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Condition S and Condition R imply that 
zln)1(
)1(1 μφ
μφγ +
+−> . This condition together with Condition E 
imply that the coefficient on tE  is positive in (A6), so that the dynamic system is characterized by global 
instability. Therefore, tE  must jump to its non-zero steady-state value given by  
(A7) 0
ln)1)(1()1(
ln)1( >⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+++
−++=
z
zE γμφφμ
γϕϕρ
ϕ
μ
. 
Substituting (A7) into (A2) and using the R&D production function rL.ϕλ =  yield 
(A8) 0
ln)1()1/()1(
)/1()1/()1( >−+++
+−++==
z
Lr γφμμφ
ϕρφμμφ
ϕ
λ
. 
The aggregate production function xtt LZC =  implies tttt ZZCC // && =  while the price index tt ZP /μ=  
implies tttt ZZPP // && −= . Substituting these conditions into (5) yields 
(A9) gr .γρ += . 
Finally, combining (18) and )1(. ttt LwC −=φ  yields 
(A10) ttttttt CwvgrLwvgrC .)()( φ−+−=+−=  
because ttt PVv /=  grows at rate g  along the balanced-growth path.■ 
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Figure 1: Industrial R&D as a Share of Non-Farm Business-Sector Output in the U.S.
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Data sources: (a) National Science Foundation: Division of Science Resources Statistics; and (b) Bureau of 
Economic Analysis: National Income and Product Accounts.  
Footnote: R&D is net of federal spending, and non-farm business-sector output is calculated as GDP net of 
government spending and farm-sector output. The trend from the data is extracted using a standard HP-filter with a 
smoothing parameter of 100 for the annual frequency.  
 
